The year 2026 opens with a succession of US manoeuvres that continue to shake the global balance, while subterranean currents roil the international scene: the military attack on Venezuela has not yet exhausted its shockwaves, and Trump has already turned his attention to Greenland, alternating economic seduction with threats of force, displaying an arrogance that spares not even allies, revealing either the brutal violence of military hegemony or perhaps its terminal agony before collapse. As the rift between the United States and Europe widens precisely because of the dispute over Greenland, the foundations of the NATO alliance are wavering dangerously: what impact will all this have on the global order?
Recently, Sergey Karaganov, Honorary Chairman of Russia’s Council on Foreign and Defence Policy and former diplomatic adviser to Putin, took part in an event organised by Guancha.cn, where he engaged in dialogue with Professor Huang Jing to explore the deep logic of the decline of American hegemony and its global consequences. Starting from burning issues such as the kidnapping of Maduro and the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, they traced the oscillations of Western hegemony from the Cold War to the present day, analysed the strategic trajectory of the United States from global expansion to the contraction of its sphere of influence, jointly warned of the global disasters that could arise from a “disorderly decline”, and argued for the need for China and Russia to cooperate in reshaping the international order, helping American global hegemony to complete an “orderly decline”.
What follows is the edited transcript by Guancha.cn (Part One).
Huang Jing: Ladies and gentlemen, today I have the great privilege of welcoming Dr Karaganov, one of the foremost scholars in the field of international relations, not only in Russia but globally.
Allow me to briefly introduce him to the audience. Karaganov currently serves as academic supervisor at the School of International Economics and Diplomacy of the National Research University – Higher School of Economics (HSE), where he has also previously served as rector, and he is Honorary Chairman of Russia’s Presidential Council on Foreign and Defence Policy.
Since the 1990s, Dr Karaganov has been a member of the Russian Presidential Advisory Council. His research interests and areas of expertise include Soviet and Russian foreign and defence policy, international political economy, security issues, studies on “Greater Russia”, US–European relations, and the “new world order” – and it is precisely this expert with whom I will be in conversation today.
Today we will focus on three main themes: first, the American invasion of Venezuela and the kidnapping of President Maduro and his wife; second, the prospects of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, on which I am sure Dr Karaganov has much experience to share; and finally, just as importantly, how Sino-American relations may evolve from a Russian perspective, considering the current situation among China, the United States and Russia.
Karaganov: Thank you. We have been old friends for many years now, and I am truly happy to see you again.
The Resort to Violence Reflects the Decline of American Hegemony
Huang Jing: My first question concerns the kidnapping of President Maduro and his wife: what do you think will be the future impact of this event? I regard it as an act of violent aggression.
Karaganov: First of all, like everyone else, I do not know the truth, because we still lack concrete facts. This kidnapping does indeed have some enigmatic aspects; it appears to be a carefully orchestrated staging, in a sense it is; but who is behind it remains a mystery – I mean, it is obvious that these are operations by US security services, but who may be assisting them we cannot know.
However, one thing is absolutely clear: Trump and the United States are trying to shift their centre of gravity towards the Western Hemisphere, while gradually abandoning their role of global leadership. This process in fact began some fifteen to seventeen years ago, but at the time we were not aware of it; most people did not notice it.
Huang Jing: We became aware of it about fifteen years ago.
Karaganov: Yes, exactly. In 2006 or 2007, almost twenty years ago now. But at that time it was only internal discussion; we saw this trend emerging. Incidentally, when President Obama came to power, his idea was to return to an “America First” strategy, but the group of globalists surrounding him did not allow it.
What is deplorable now is the kidnapping of Maduro and those acts of piracy consisting in the seizure of oil tankers – these are unequivocally crimes. The positive aspect is that the Americans are retreating towards the Western Hemisphere: problems will arise there, but they are gradually transforming themselves from a global hegemonic power into a conventional regional power, ceasing to pretend to be masters of the world. It is like a coin with two sides; good and bad coexist. Naturally, anyone should condemn the kidnapping of the democratically elected president of a sovereign country, a crime of such enormity that it must be denounced, and we hope that somehow we will be able to secure the release of Maduro and his wife.
This reflects a deeper problem in US foreign policy. The current situation is that, for many years, I have argued for the need to create conditions in which the United States can withdraw from its global role without having to resort to war.
Huang Jing: Yes, I remember your essay Disorder or Order, where you argued that American decline represents a threat to all of us, right? I think you are correct. This so-called retreat from the hegemonic role did indeed begin about ten to twenty years ago, because the United States simply can no longer sustain its international hegemonic system, a system that has been dragging on since 1991, while the trend of decline had begun much earlier – you said 2006 or 2007, but more precisely we could place it in 2008.
Karaganov: The decline of American hegemony, and of that of the Western world, began in the 1960s. At that time the signs were already extremely evident, but no one reflected seriously on them. However, when the Soviet Union reached a certain level of nuclear parity, some people realised that the United States was beginning to lose its advantage, which undermined the foundations of Western dominance over world affairs – a supremacy that had lasted for five hundred years.
Then suddenly, in the 1960s and 1970s, the United States suffered consecutive defeats and cascading crises, such as the oil crisis and so on. Subsequently there was a partial recovery, but only partial, until the collapse of the Soviet Union offered an incredible opportunity; for the West, especially for the United States, it seemed that the trend of decline had been reversed. In reality, that situation lasted only fifteen years: post-Soviet Russia began to reorganise and gradually recover its position in the world.
At the same time, China also began to emerge as a great power. Because the Americans were still in that state of post-Soviet-collapse euphoria, they made a series of grave strategic errors. At the time I could not understand how this was possible – I knew them all, the entire American elite. I could not believe my eyes: what were they doing? They were helping China to become the world’s leading power, because they believed that China would develop according to the capitalist model and would establish a “democratic” system – where “democracy” means chaotic internal governance but alignment with the United States. The West inadvertently made this mistake.
Naturally, the situation then worsened. While the United States remained trapped in that euphoric state, it launched several invasions that all ended in failure: Afghanistan and Iraq are examples. After that, the retreat really gathered momentum – it was the end of 2007, the beginning of 2008; that crisis precisely pushed the American elite to decide inwardly to resume the retreat.
Huang Jing: I largely agree with your analysis. Indeed, the United States began to encounter difficulties in the 1960s, and also in the 1970s. The most striking example is the defeat in the Vietnam War. However, they partially recovered, mainly thanks to the collapse of the Soviet Union. After that, I have always told Western colleagues who believed – especially Europeans – that Russia was a failed state: no, no, no, Russia is by no means a failed state; Russia is a great power that is re-emerging, and on this you are completely mistaken.
Naturally, the rise of China is another factor that has overturned the situation, but on this point I want to disagree slightly: I do not believe that China’s successes were achieved exclusively thanks to American assistance. China’s rise is due to the adoption of correct policies and the implementation of appropriate methods of reform and opening up, right? China sought to integrate into what you call the “Western system”, developing from the inside out through integration into the world system. Obviously, they naively hoped to be able to transform China through peaceful evolution and bring it over to their side, and on this I fully agree with you: that American vision was completely wrong.
Karaganov: I fully agree with your assessment, but I want to analyse the issue from another angle. China’s development was certainly possible because it was allowed to develop, but at the same time also because the Soviet Union provided a protective security umbrella. When the United States began to realise that China was becoming the future leader, they never really dared to consider attacking China, even when Chinese military power was relatively weak – now it is even less likely.
Because in the meantime the Americans made another strategic error of incredible magnitude. From then on, I have witnessed how my American friends and colleagues – a rather stifling group of individuals – through their actions pushed China and Russia ever closer together. Our relations were already good, being neighbours; but it was they who forced us to form an unshakeable alliance – even if not formally institutionalised.
What has happened over the past fifteen years is that this quasi-alliance or semi-alliance has doubled the overall strength of both Russia and China; China’s global strategic power has tripled, and Russia’s likewise. This was a colossal and astonishing error committed by Western competitors.
American Decline Is Positive, but a “Disorderly Decline” Would in Itself Be a Catastrophe
Huang Jing: Allow me to analyse this issue from a historical perspective. As a Chinese, I know well and still remember that the Soviet Union once helped China to build a complete industrial system, laying the foundations for China’s future development. But the same Soviet Union made serious mistakes due to over-expansion; for example, the invasion of Afghanistan was a huge error, which led to the formation of a fragile cooperation between the United States and China. I believe that the 1980s were the golden age of Sino-American relations, because the two countries cooperated with each other, jointly balancing the Soviet Union at the strategic level – something we both know.
Karaganov: I remember it well. The Soviet Union did indeed make mistakes, but it was not only a matter of over-expansion. We were arrogant, mainly because of Khrushchev’s arrogance towards Mao, despite the fact that in the early 1950s our relations were excellent. Naturally, there is also an important factor: Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders refused to help China develop nuclear weapons, and that was indeed an erroneous judgement.
Huang Jing: But China nevertheless managed to develop nuclear weapons.
Karaganov: Yes, although the path was tortuous, in the end through autonomous development China achieved nuclear weapons. This allowed China to maintain a favourable strategic position for decades. But if at that time we had provided assistance – as you said, at the end of the 1950s – China’s strategic position would have been even stronger, and that subsequent search for reconciliation with the United States would not have emerged, because there would have been no need for it.
Huang Jing: Exactly; history would have been completely different, and Nixon’s visit to China would never have taken place. But in any case, history teaches us that no one is perfect; we all make mistakes. But ultimately, who has made the gravest mistakes? I believe that the United States is committing the greatest error of modern history from the post-Second World War period to the present.
First of all, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States regarded itself as master of the world, and that is why it formulated the so-called “globalist strategy”, seeking to globalise everything according to the market model. I still remember the globalisation of values, American values as “universal values”, and the globalisation of “democracy”. We witnessed the “colour revolutions”, we saw the “Arab Spring”, and we know their results. And now their strategy has shifted towards the globalisation of the market economy and free trade. Obviously, their strategy has not been fully successful: China has risen, the Soviet Union collapsed but Russia has re-emerged, becoming a great power that alters the balance.
At this point, I agree with you: the United States is indeed in decline, continuously declining, to the point that it has abandoned the so-called hegemonic position, relinquishing that role of world policeman built on fear and global force.
The Western sphere of influence is contracting towards the Western Hemisphere, not because they desire it, but because they are forced to do so. I recall one of your famous statements: you said that American decline is not bad news, but that a “disorderly decline” would in itself constitute a catastrophe. Do you think that this invasion of Venezuela reflects a kind of “disorderly decline”, or is it still within a phase of “orderly decline”? Because attacking Venezuela is not a sign of American strength, but reveals precisely its intrinsic weakness.